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Abstract 
 
Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to model asymmetric information and study the profitability of venture capital 
(VC) backed initial public offerings (IPOs). Our mixtures approach endogenously separates IPOs into differentiated 
groups based on their returns’ determinants. We also analyze the factors that affect the probability that IPOs belong 
to a specific group. 
 
Design/methodology/approach – We propose a new method to model asymmetric information between investors 
and firms in VC backed IPOs. Our approach allows us to identify differentiated companies under incomplete 
information. We use a sample of 2,404 U.S. firms from 1980 through 2012 to estimate our mixture model via 
maximum likelihood. 
 
Findings – We find strong evidence that companies can be separated into two groups based on how IPO returns are 
determined. For companies in the first group the results are similar to previous studies. For companies in the second 
group we find that profitability is mainly affected by the reputation of the seed VC and capital expenditures. Tangible 
assets and age help explain group affiliation. We also motivate our findings for a continuum of heterogeneous IPO 
groups. 
 
Practical implications – The proposed mixture approach helps decrease asymmetric information for investors, 
regulators, and companies. 
 
Originality/value – Our mixture methods help decrease asymmetric information between investors and firms 
improving the probability of making profitable investments. Separating between groups of IPOs is crucial because 
different determinants of an IPO operating performance can potentially have opposite effects for different groups. 
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1. Introduction 
There is a significant amount of interest in newly issued stocks. The underpricing of Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) has been well documented as well as their long run underperformance. For the investor, it would 
certainly be profitable to obtain as much information as possible on the company that is going public 
before the IPO date. One category of private companies that have useful information to potential 
investors is IPOs backed by venture capitalists (VCs). Knowing a company’s funding VC can be instrumental 
in making a profitable investment.  
In conjunction with analyzing the firm’s information contained in the documents that the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) requires prior to an IPO, such as the S-1, we propose a new 
methodology to reduce existing asymmetric information between firms and investors. We study the 
profitability of venture capital backed IPOs where IPOs are endogenously separated into differentiated 
groups based on how their returns are determined. Moreover we also analyze the determinants of the 
probability that IPOs belongs to a specific group. Identifying differentiated companies that will go public 
can help investors determine the usefulness and impact that public information has on profitability. We 
use variables that have been previously analyzed in the VC literature (Gompers, 1995; Tian, 2011) to 
categorize VC backed IPOs. The mixture methods we propose allow us to identify differentiated 
companies even under incomplete information on their characteristics.  
Our proposed methods are a good fit to the venture capitalist industry given the existence of 
asymmetric information between the entrepreneur and the financier. The venture capitalist only has 
access to a limited number of observable characteristics that will have a marginal impact on the variables 
that define the profitability of a company. Furthermore, for other investors that want to partake in the 
IPO, the investment selection becomes easier. After the investor identifies the group affiliation of each 
IPO, he can then rely on the reputation of the VC to decide in which IPO to invest. If the investor 
understands that a reputable VC cherry picks the companies and provides managerial and consulting know 
how, then by relying on the quality of the VC the investor can participate in an IPO with a higher probability 
of success. 
The mixture methods we employ work in the presence of incomplete information and allow 
separating companies based on the role of their profitability determinants. The separation is based on the 
VCs capabilities in scrutinizing private information. If a VC is skeptical, then a company will receive more 
capital rounds than a company that is perceived as promising. Because more capital rounds translate into 
a less profitable long term performance, it is in the interest of investors to estimate the unobserved 
characteristics of the company prior to investing in them. 
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One key benefit of using our proposed mixture specification is that we can model unobserved 
heterogeneity of VC backed IPOs. Our approach endogenously separates the companies into groups based 
on limited information about the company. Following the previous literature (Gompers, 1995; Tian, 2011), 
we compute industry averages based on tangibility of assets, research and development, and market to 
book value of equity. We find that the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets is the main 
indicator that determines the group affiliation of each company. This separation is crucial because 
variables that were previously considered as determinants of an IPO operating performance can 
potentially have opposite effects once heterogeneity across groups is accounted for.  
The maximum likelihood estimates of our model find strong evidence supporting the existence of 
differentiated groups of companies. We find that the results for type-𝐴 companies are similar to previous 
studies, i.e., capital rounds have a negative effect on profitability. Moreover, syndication and market value 
at IPO also have negative effects on Return on Assets (ROA). The factors that have a positive effect on 
performance are the length of the financing process prior to the IPO, the reputation of the seed VC, and 
the ratio of capital expenditures to assets. For type-𝐵  companies we find that profitability is mostly 
affected by the reputation of the seed VC and capital expenditures. The reputation of the VC is positively 
associated to ROA with a marginal effect on ROA that is about three times the magnitude estimated for 
type-𝐴  companies. Interestingly, the ratio of capital expenditures to assets operates in the opposite 
direction for different company types and its magnitude is about ten times larger for type-𝐵. This ratio of 
capital expenditures has been rarely analyzed in previous literature because it was found to be either not 
statistically significant or with a relatively small marginal effect on ROA. However, our results suggest that 
capital expenditures have a highly statistically significant effect on returns of the VC backed IPOs. We 
argue that previous literature that failed to model differentiated groups of companies and pooled all 
companies into a single group missed the significance of the effect. 
For the investor interested in IPOs, there is a high degree of risk given the lack of historical data on 
these companies. However, our proposed methods give evidence that for VC backed IPOs there is a group 
of companies that will be strongly and positively influenced by the reputation of the seed VC. For this 
same group, a high ratio of capital expenditures to total assets on the year of the IPO can decrease the 
operating performance. The seed VC is information available to all investors through the S-1 form and the 
reputation of the seed VC can be determined through several measures. Our definition of VC reputation 
comes from Nahata (2008) that looks at the participation of the VC on the IPO market by computing the 
ratio of the VC investments to the total amount of VC backed IPOs in a particular year.  
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The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of venture capital and IPOs. Section 
3 describes the data while section 4 explains the empirical approach. Section 5 presents and discusses the 
results. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Discussion of the Interaction between Venture Capital and IPOs 
A key element for venture capitalists is the IPO and one of the most studied elements in IPOs has been its 
underpricing. Ibbotson (1975), Ritter (1987), and Loughran and Ritter (2004) have documented IPO 
underpricing in the United States. After the initial euphoria that results from the underpricing discount, 
these investments have long run average returns (Boyer, 2004; Loughran and Ritter, 1995).  Long term 
stockholders should also be concerned with the post-issue operating performance. Jain and Kini (1994) 
document a decline in operating return on assets despite an increase in sales and capital expenditures. 
Jain and Kini (1995) compare the operating performance of VC backed IPOs to non VC IPOs. They find that 
VC backed IPOs perform better than the remaining IPOs in terms of operating returns on assets. They 
argue that these results are due to better monitoring by the VC before and after the IPO. 
The behavior of the VC is designed not only to reduce the adverse selection problem but it is also 
motivated to improve its reputation on the market. Nahata (2008) shows that VCs with a strong reputation 
have a positive effect on a company’s asset productivity at their IPOs. Krishnan, Ivanov, Masulis, and Singh 
(2011) find similar effects on the long term performance. 
Sørensen (2007) states that experienced VCs are better at sorting promising entrepreneurs and their 
advising further enhances the profitability of the entrepreneur. If more experienced VCs can select the 
most promising companies, then the performance of these companies strengthens the reputation of the 
VC regardless of the advising. Endogeneity arises because an experienced VC can judge a company better 
than a young VC and this is reflected in the company’s future profitability. This phenomenon can be 
observed in our results where one of the two main characteristics that affect a company’s performance is 
the reputation of the seed VC.  Other relevant participant in the IPO process is the underwriter. Yip, Su, 
and Ang (2009) find that the underwriter’s reputation has a strong influence in the performance of an IPO. 
If a VC backed IPO is underwritten by a leading investment bank, investors earn above market returns in 
the long run. Jones and Swaleheen (2010) find that underwriter’s reputation is positively related to short 
term returns. 
VCs allocate capital based on their estimation of an entrepreneur’s future profitability. These capital 
allocation decisions are made under uncertainty and with limited information on the characteristics of the 
company. When looking at the VCs decisions to invest we have that, for example, based on a survey by 
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Kaplan and Strömberg (2004), management quality is cited by 60% of the respondents, good performance 
by 27%, large and growing markets by 69%, and competitiveness and likelihood of customer adoption by 
30%. This information is not observed and it is still largely uncertain during the first year after the IPO. We 
expect our mixtures approach to capture part of this information.  
Our approach to analyze VC backed IPOs is new as we exploit recent developments in mixture models 
(see, e.g., Gan and Hernandez, 2013).  Simpler mixture structures were used in Lee and Porter (1984) to 
separate firms into cooperating and non-cooperating with a railroad cartel during the 1880s. Gan and 
Mosquera (2008) study credit card consumers and estimate the probability that consumers belong to a 
group that is more credit worthy. In the insurance industry companies are concerned with the pricing of 
policies based on individuals' heterogeneous risk preferences. Interestingly, individuals have private 
information with regards to their own risk that creates a problem of adverse selection to insurance 
companies. Gan, Huang, and Mayer (2011) use mixtures and divide individuals into two types. One group 
prefers insurance and is less likely to suffer an accident whereas the other group dislikes insurance and is 
more likely to experience an accident.  
 
3. Data 
Our main source of data comes from the Securities Data Company (SDC) Global New Issues database. We 
use IPOs backed by venture capital firms that became public between January 1, 1980 and August 1, 2012. 
We exclude foreign issues, IPOs with an offer price less than $5, utilities (SIC code between 4900 and 
4999), finance (SIC code between 6000 and 6999), and spin-offs. We also remove firms with missing 
venture capital information or round information. Accounting information such as assets, book value of 
equity, research and development, net income, capital expenditures, and property, plant and equipment 
is from Compustat. Market value information on the IPO date is from CRSP and the founding date is from 
Jay Ritter’s database (http://bear.cba.ufl.edu/ritter/ipodata.htm). The final sample has 2,404 IPOs. 
We are concerned with understanding what variables affect the profitability of firms. The main 
dependent variable is Return on Assets (𝑅𝑂𝐴) measured as net income including extraordinary items 
divided by total assets on the year of the IPO. For robustness, we also compute Returns on Equity (𝑅𝑂𝐸) 
which equals net income including extraordinary items divided by total book value of equity. Additional 
variables in the model include the number of capital rounds (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) that the entrepreneur receives 
before going public and the number of venture capitalists (𝑉𝐶𝑠) that participate in the IPO process. 
Moreover, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 indicates the number of years between the year when the company receives the 
first capital round until the year of the IPO. The ratio 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  equals the company’s capital 
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expenditures divided by its total assets on the year of the IPO. Following Nahata (2008)'s measure for VC 
reputation ( 𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 ), we construct a measure of the rating of the VC. That is, we compute the 
capitalization share of the VC as the market value of all companies taken public by the seed VC from 1980 
until the year of the first round and then divide this by the aggregate market value of all VC backed IPOs 
for the same period. If the VC had no IPOs on the year of the first capital round, we use the closest 
aggregate IPO value within a 3 year window. If there are still no IPOs backed by the VC in this window, we 
use the average VC capitalization share during the year of the first round. Finally, if there is more than one 
seed VC, we keep the highest capitalization share. We also use Market Value (𝑀𝑉) defined as the closing 
price times the number of shares outstanding on the day of the IPO.  
Additional variables include the number of years between the founding year and the year of the first 
venture capital round (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑) and the amount of money given in the first round (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦). 
We also include annual industry average ratios for three variables. The average industry market-to-book 
ratio (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵) measured as the market value of equity divided by book value of equity, the 
average industry research and development to total assets (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷), and the average ratio of 
property, plant and equipment to total assets (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸). We follow Gompers (1995)'s methodology 
to obtain the industry ratios. That is, we compute the mean average industry ratio across all years when 
venture capital rounds take place. For each ratio we compute the average of all companies in Compustat 
for that particular year with the same four digit SIC. If there are not at least 4 companies with the same 4 
digit code we look at companies with the same 3 digit and even 2 digit SIC. 
Table 1 presents the summary statistics. The mean 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 tell a similar story of VC backed 
IPOs that have a negative profitability on the first year. However, for both profitability measures the 
standard deviation is approximately three times the mean. The range of observations is even wider for 
𝑅𝑂𝐴 where the minimum value is -7.658 and the maximum value is 0.584. For 𝑅𝑂𝐸, the range is only 
1.911 going from a minimum of -1.552 to a maximum of 0.359. The number of venture capital rounds 
before an IPO is 4.879, going from 1 round to 24 rounds. The number of venture capitalists that participate 
on an IPO is 6.34. The difference between the number of rounds and the number of venture capitalists 
that participate in an IPO show that the process can be very different for some firms. The incubation 
process takes an average of 4.46 years and its standard deviation is 3.53. Our sample also shows that there 
are 10 companies that spent more than 20 years in the process.  The measure of VC reputation suggested 
by Nahata (2008) is the VC capitalization ratio and its standard deviation is almost twice the average. The 
minimum and the maximum indicate a wide variety of venture capitalist firms trying to take companies 
public. The market value of firms also shows a wide spectrum of firms going public. The mean market 
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value of an IPO is more than $400 million and its standard deviation is almost three times larger. Capital 
expenditures show the amount invested in improving or acquiring tangible assets which serves to 
ameliorate the asymmetry of information between the entrepreneur and the financier. This is because 
the financier can keep the physical assets in the case of liquidation. The average capital expenditures over 
assets is .074 with a standard deviation barely above this level. 
 
[Table 1, here] 
 
The mean of 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 indicates that there is an average of 4.86 years between founding and the 
first round of VC capital. The range is 113 years, which tells us that some companies have acquired 
significant reputation (as measured in years) to decrease the information asymmetry but some VCs may 
invest in premature companies where the asymmetry can be very large. 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 equals the amount 
of money received at the first round. There is also a very wide range of values for these companies. 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is the average market to book value of equity. Some companies have a relatively low book 
value which creates a relatively wide range for this variable. We also observe in the sample that for 70 
companies the market value is ten times larger than its book value of equity. The average industry 
research and development expense has an impact on the number of capital rounds as shown by Gompers 
(1995). The more research and development expense in a given industry, the greater the number of 
rounds. The standard deviation shows the wide range between ratios. The last indicator variable is the 
industry property, plant and equipment. This ratio also measures the tangibility of assets, Gompers (1995) 
and Tian (2011) have previously shown that tangibility decreases the number of capital rounds prior to an 
IPO. The average ratio is 0.295 and the standard deviation is 0.115. The range is far narrower than the 
range of the previous two industry measures. 
 
4. Empirical Model 
The empirical approach is initially aimed at understanding the variables that affect profitability of firms. 
Our approach is new in the sense that it allows for differentiated effects of firms’ profitability 
determinants depending on the type of firm. Moreover, firm type is unobserved and filtered from the 
data. Our dependent variable that captures profitability will be either 𝑅𝑂𝐴  or 𝑅𝑂𝐸 . For the set of 
independent variables 𝑋 we have the number of capital rounds (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑), number of venture capitalists 
( 𝑉𝐶𝑠 ), the years between first round and IPO ( 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 ), market value ( 𝑀𝑉 ), 𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝  and 
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𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  as described in detail in the data section. To model unobserved firm types in the 
determination of profitability we jointly estimate the following equations: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 = {
𝑋𝛽𝐴 + 𝜀𝑖,𝐴        if  𝛿 = 𝐴
𝑋𝛽𝐵 + 𝜀𝑖,𝐵         if  𝛿 = 𝐵
 (1) 
  
where 𝑖 denotes the firm, 𝑋 is the matrix of regressors and 𝜀𝑖,𝛿 for 𝛿 = 𝐴, 𝐵 is the error term. Notice that 
equations (1) capture differentiated marginal effects 𝛽𝐴  or 𝛽𝐵  of each of the elements of 𝑋  on 𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖 
depending on whether firms are of type-𝐴 or type-𝐵.  
We estimate equations (1) via maximum likelihood under the assumptions that the each of the error 
terms follow a normal distribution, i.e., 𝜀𝑖,𝛿~𝑁(0, 𝜎𝜀,𝛿
2 ). Then we can write the log-likelihood for the 𝑖th 
firm as: 
 
ln 𝑙𝑖 = ln [
𝑞𝑖
𝜎𝜀,𝐴√2𝜋
exp (−
𝜀𝑖,𝐴
2
2𝜎𝜀,𝐴
2 ) +
(1 − 𝑞𝑖)
𝜎𝜀,𝐵√2𝜋
exp (−
𝜀𝑖,𝐵
2
2𝜎𝜀,𝐵
2 )] (2) 
 
where the mixing parameter 𝑞𝑖 can be interpreted as the probability that firm 𝑖 is in a regime dominated 
by type-𝐴 firms. 
We can additionally model this probability to be a function of observable factors: 
 
𝑞𝑖 = Prob(𝛿 = 𝐴) = 𝐹(𝑍𝛼) (3) 
 
where 𝑍 is the matrix of observable factors that includes the years between founding and the first round 
of VC capital (𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 ), the amount of money received in the first round (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦), and 
industry averages of the market-to-book ratio ( 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵 ), research and development 
(𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷), and the ratio of property, plant and equipment to total assets (𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸). We 
expect the different variables in 𝑍 to help us identify the firm type. 𝛼 is the vector of coefficients to be 
estimated and 𝐹(∙) is a function that we approximate using the logistic cumulative distribution function. 
Our mixture model of equations (1) and (3) is similar in flexibility to Gan and Hernandez (2013) who 
use mixtures to study hotels' spatial competition where collusive regimes are unobserved. Their model 
jointly estimates the price and occupancy rates, while in our setting we estimate a single profitability 
equation. Asymmetric information occurs in both models as hotels in Gan and Hernandez (2013) know 
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more than consumers about when collusion takes place. Likewise in our setting investors have less 
information than firms during an IPO.1 
 
5. Results 
5.1 Pooled Results 
As a first approach in the estimation of equation (1) we pool across all observations and assume 𝛽𝐴 = 𝛽𝐵. 
The maximum likelihood estimates are reported in Table 2. Columns 1 through 3 have 𝑅𝑂𝐴  as the 
dependent variable, while profitability is captured by 𝑅𝑂𝐸 in columns 4 through 6. Moreover, different 
columns provide different specifications for the matrix of controls 𝑋. Across all columns the effect of 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 on profitability is negative and highly statistically significant. This is consistent with previous work 
on IPOs. In particular, Jain and Kini (1995) also find a negative effects for VC backed IPOs. Moreover, Tian 
(2011) shows that the number of rounds has a negative effect on 𝑅𝑂𝐴 .2  This result provides some 
evidence that rationing capital is hampering the profitability of companies. Even though VCs need to 
monitor companies in order to minimize any potential pursuance of private benefits by the entrepreneurs, 
the costs of rationing capital are larger than the benefits of monitoring. Therefore, entrepreneurs are 
either focusing mostly on short term goals to guarantee the next round of capital or simply they do not 
have enough resources to focus on long term projects that will increase the profitability of the company.  
Consistent across all specifications that include the number of venture capitalists that participate in 
an IPO, we have that 𝑉𝐶𝑠 also has a negative and statistically significant effect on profitability. While the 
effect is smaller in magnitude and marginally significant in columns 2 and 5, once we include our full set 
of regressors in 𝑋 it is significant at the 1 percent level. This negative effect of syndication can be a signal 
that the seed capitalists only allow the participation of other VCs when there is a high degree of 
uncertainty about the company. Also, when several VCs fund a company they may be more interested in 
future growth rather than near profitability. This is consistent with Tian (2011) who finds a negative effect 
of syndication on the first year’s 𝑅𝑂𝐴. However, Tian (2012) also finds that the effect of syndication on 
the average 𝑅𝑂𝐴 after four years of an IPO is positive. 
From columns 3 and 6 we find that 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 has a positive and highly significant effect on 𝑅𝑂𝐴 
and 𝑅𝑂𝐸, which is in line with the findings of Tian (2011). He finds that the age of the firm also has a 
positive effect on 𝑅𝑂𝐴. Our 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 estimates shows that the longer the time a company spends 
                                                          
1 While our methods are applied to VC, they can easily be extended to any IPO. 
2 In addition, Jain and Kini (1994) indicate that the profitability of an IPO is negative in the short-term, which is 
consistent with the mean values of 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 in Table 1. 
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maturing, the more profitable it will become. We can explain this positive effect as a result from 
decreasing asymmetric information. It is reasonable to believe that as time passes by, information 
asymmetry between the venture capitalist and the company decreases. These companies were financed 
by seed VC firms that had little pressure to go public prematurely in order to raise capital from their 
partners for future projects. Through this patient financing process, companies were taken public after 
achieving a certain level of success. Therefore, we should expect higher 𝑅𝑂𝐴 from a longer incubation 
period because these companies were probably already profitable prior to the IPO date. 
 
[Table 2, here] 
 
Turning to 𝑉𝐶 𝑐𝑎𝑝  we find that a positive and highly statistically significant coefficient. When 
comparing the point estimates from columns 3 and 6 we see that the magnitude of the effect of 𝑉𝐶 𝑐𝑎𝑝 
is larger when 𝑅𝑂𝐸 is the dependent variable. In line with our results Nahata (2008) also finds that the 
reputation of the lead VC has a positive effect on the sales to book asset of the VC backed firm one year 
prior to the IPO and an even stronger effect on the year of the IPO.  
 
5. 2 Allowing for Differentiated Effects 
We now turn to the estimation of equations (1) when allowing for a differentiated effect from the 
variables in 𝑋 on profitability. The maximum likelihood estimates using equation 2 are reported in Table 
3. We initially need to assess whether the two-type model represents an improvement from the pooled 
model. To do this we use the likelihood ratio test under the null that the pooled model represents a better 
fit. We find that the likelihood ratio statistic for 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is 1792.02 while it is 1469.6 for 𝑅𝑂𝐸. Both have an 
associated p-value of zero showing strong evidence against the null. Hence, we conclude that the two-
type model represents an improvement in terms of model fit. Moreover, we also test if there are 
additional types using the null that the two-type model has a better fit when compared to a model with 
three-types. The likelihood ratio statistics for 𝑅𝑂𝐴 and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 are 8.984 and 6.976 respectively with the 
corresponding p-values being 0.254 and 0.431. We interpret this as strong evidence supporting the two-
type model. 
Table 3 reports two separate columns for each model because the estimation endogenously separates 
each of the observations into one of two different groups. We have that 88.7% of the firms in the sample 
can be considered type-𝐴 firms as the predicted probability of being type-𝐴 is greater than 0.5 (i.e., 𝑞𝑖 > 
0.5). In terms of sign and magnitude the point estimates on 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠, 𝑉𝐶𝑠, 𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝, and 𝑀𝑉 
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for type-𝐴 firms are consistent and very close to the pooled model. On the other hand the estimates show 
that group 𝐵 firms are heavily influenced by the seed VC capitalization (𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝) with the magnitude of 
the estimates on 𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 being about three times larger for type-𝐵 firms. This difference shows that the 
reputation of the VC can have a huge impact on the profitability of an IPO. This could be because the seed 
VC can provide expertise to improve the operations of a company or that a VC with a strong reputation 
cherry-picks which company to finance amongst the several entrepreneurs looking for venture capital 
funds. 
 
[Table 3, here] 
 
Similar differentiated effects hold for 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 . Interestingly for group 𝐴  firms, the sign is 
positive and consistent with the pooled model. However while statistically significant, for group 𝐵 firms 
the effect is negative. The negative effect of 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 on profitability for type-𝐵 firms (with a point 
estimate of -0.881 for model 1) in the presence of a reputable VC can be interpreted as a long term 
investment that decreases profitability on the year of the IPO. For this group it would helpful to investors 
if they know the fixed assets required to operate in the industry and the seed VC. These two variables 
have a strong effect on the profitability of the company. A feasible explanation is that group 𝐵 companies 
have not made enough capital expenditures prior to the IPO but after the IPO, they have the necessary 
capital to make these investments but short term profitability decreases. This is consistent with post IPO 
monitoring by VCs that are concerned with the growth prospects of the company. The ratio of capital 
expenditures to assets for group 𝐴 operates in the opposite direction. This suggests that when the seed 
VC is not as relevant, then other variables will have a greater effect. If the VC is not as strong as in group 
𝐵 , then capital rounds, syndication, and market value have a negative effect. Incubation and capital 
expenditures have positive and significant coefficients, which can help overcome a weak VC.  
On the estimates for 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and 𝑉𝐶𝑠 have a differentiated effect on profitability for different VC 
backed IPOs. We argue that for group 𝐵, rounds do not have costs on profitability because a reputable VC 
has more experience in monitoring a company while limiting the costs of capital rationing. In terms of 
syndication, a VC with more experience may invite other VCs to participate in the IPO to improve the 
operations of the company but the negative effects on profitability disappear. Since our measure of VC 
reputation is based on long term market capitalization, it would be detrimental for the seed VC to invite 
other VCs only when the profitability of the company is uncertain. If the seed VC only invited other VCs to 
invest if it is unsure about the company, it would be a signal of the weakness of the company. The 
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differentiated effect we find on 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and 𝑉𝐶𝑠 when comparing groups 𝐴 and 𝐵 from both models 1 
and 2 provide evidence that type-𝐵 companies depend more on a reputable VC. This type of VCs do not 
need to grandstand and have less incentive to damage their reputation by inviting other VCs to invest only 
when there is a low probability of success. 
  
5. 3 Explaining the Differentiated Effects 
The estimates in Table 3 assume that the probability that a firm belongs to a particular group is fixed. We 
now relax this assumption and following equation 3 we allow the probability to depend on a particular set 
of observables 𝑍. As an initial approach the set of variables in 𝑍 include the amount of money the VC 
received in the first year (𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦) and the number of year prior to the first round of money 
(𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑). Previous literature on VC does not consider these variables as right-hand-side regressors 
in equation 1, but rather as variables that affect the number of capital rounds (Tian, 2011). As such we 
expect these variables in 𝑍  to be correlated with information about the company that is available to 
investors and that is correlated with unobservables that determine the type of VC. The maximum 
likelihood estimates are presented in Table 4. 
 
[Table 4, here] 
 
Consistent across both models in Table 4, the marginal effect of the variables in 𝑋 on profitability are 
very close to the results in Table 3. For the estimates of 𝛼  in equation 3 we observe that both 
specifications find that 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 is not statistically significant. Moreover, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 is statistically 
significant at at least 1% level. This positive estimate indicates that the longer the firm waits for the first 
round of funding by a VC, the more likely it is to be a type-𝐴 firm. For example, firms that wait very little 
for the first round of funding are more likely to be type-𝐵, hence the number of rounds (𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠) is more 
likely to have no statistically significant effect on profitability. 
 
[Table 5, here] 
Table 5 models 𝑍 by additionally including three industry averages calculated previously in Gompers 
(1995) and Tian (2011). Consistent across both of the models in the table, the average market value to 
book value of equity has no statistically significant effect. Moreover research and development also is not 
statistically significant. Only the industry average ratio of property, plant and equipment to assets is 
statistically significant and has a positive effect on the probability of being type-𝐴. This positive effect 
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means that if the company belongs to an industry with particularly large values for property, plant and 
equipment (relative to assets) this company is more likely to be in group 𝐴. Likewise, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 and 𝑉𝐶𝑠 
are more likely to have no effect on profitability for companies that come from industries with lower levels 
of expenditures on property, plant and equipment. A firm from group 𝐵 may suffer short term profitability 
in the IPO year from an increase in capital expenditures. However, since it belongs to an industry with low 
tangible assets it might not be necessary to spend in property, plant, and equipment. Also supporting the 
statistical significance of 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸 on the probability equation, we have that the tangibility of assets 
decreases the information asymmetries because the venture capitalists can keep the fixed assets in case 
of liquidation. The amount of fixed assets decrease the number of venture capital rounds (Gompers, 1995; 
Tian, 2011). In addition, an increase in capital rounds can decrease the profitability of a company by 
limiting the amount of capital available. If information asymmetries are too high, rounds can help monitor 
the entrepreneur and limit him from pursuing private benefits. Therefore, if there is a high amount of 
tangibility of assets, then rounds have more costs than benefits because there are less deleterious effects 
from information asymmetry. Finally, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 and 𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 have qualitatively the same effects 
as in Table 4. For the differentiated marginal effect of 𝑋 on profitability across groups, the estimates in 
Table 5 appear very close to the estimates in Tables 3 and 4. 
 
5.4 Continuous Types 
The estimation of equations 1 and 3 along with the interpretation of the results has focused on the 
existence of two types of companies. This interpretation is based on an implicit threshold of 0.5 in the 
probability of being of a particular type (e.g., being type-𝐴). Notice that the probability 𝑞𝑖 of being of a 
particular type is a continuum that goes from zero to one. An alternative interpretation of the results in 
Tables 3 through 5 is that there exists a continuum of types that fall in between group 𝐴 and group 𝐵. 
That is, for each company in the sample the profitability determinants 𝑋 will be a linear combination of 
the marginal effects of groups 𝐴 and 𝐵. More formally, the marginal effects of 𝑋 on profitability for firm 
𝑖 are given by 𝛽𝑖 = 𝑞𝑖𝛽𝐴 + (1 − 𝑞𝑖)𝛽𝐵. The probability 𝑞𝑖 is specific to the company and it is determined 
by the fitted values from equation 3 for each firm given its firm characteristics as captured in 𝑍. Because 
different firms are expected to have different values for 𝑞𝑖 , hence our alternative interpretation of a 
continuum of types. 
Figure 1 shows the histogram of the fitted values ?̂?𝑖  for the companies in the sample using the 
specification of model 1 in Table 5. As before, these fitted values are interpreted as the probability that 
firm 𝑖 is in group 𝐴. If we set a threshold of 0.5 (i.e., ?̂?𝑖 > 0.5), we have that 77.7% of the firms belong to 
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group A. Figure 1 illustrates how most of the firms are closer to group 𝐴, meaning that the marginal effects 
on profitability put a relatively heavier weight on the estimates  of group 𝐴. If investors are not aware of 
the observables in 𝑍 and given that it is more likely that a firm will belong to group 𝐴, then consistent with 
the estimates of the pooled model investors will expect a positive effect on profitability from 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 and to a lower extent the reputation of the seed VC. The length of the incubation should 
also have a positive effect on profitability. 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠, 𝑉𝐶𝑠, and 𝑀𝑉 will most likely decrease the profitability 
of the IPO. 
 
[Figure 1, here] 
 
However, if an investor proceeds to use the observables in 𝑍 and infers on the type of firm (𝐴 or 𝐵 or 
a linear combination of 𝐴 and 𝐵) then the investor can have a more accurate assessment of the IPOs and 
the determinants of its profitability. If the investor can identify the firms that belong to group 𝐵, then he 
will know that the reputation of the seed VC will have a high positive effect on profitability and that the 
ratio of capital expenditures to assets will have the opposite effect on 𝑅𝑂𝐴. On the other hand, if an 
investor fails to use the information in 𝑍 and uses the pooled model for investment decisions, the investor 
may not be able to accurately identify a group 𝐵 company. Hence investment decisions based on 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 
or 𝑉𝐶𝑠 will be suboptimal. 
 
5.5 Implications 
Our empirical results have implications at various levels. Using data from the Securities and Exchange 
Commission investors can use the estimates of equations (1) to predict first year profitability of VC backed 
IPOs to guide their investment decisions. Given the high demand for IPOs by institutional investors, it is 
quite useful to distinguish indicators of a firm’s future profitability. Furthermore if other investors are 
hesitant about investing on IPOs, our mixture approach should be helpful in reducing existing asymmetric 
information. Therefore, a wider and more diverse pool of investors should decrease the cost of capital for 
newly public companies. Other avenue for acquiring IPOs is through Exchange Traded Funds (ETF) such as 
the Renaissance Capital IPO. If the average investor can estimate with more certainty the profitability of 
a company, then there should be more investors willing to acquire ETFs. 
The same estimates can also be used by investment banks to guide IPO initial pricing decisions 
and by firms themselves to decrease underpricing. If investment banks purposely underprice an IPO to 
decrease the probability of litigation after the IPO, they will be more comfortable providing a more 
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accurate price if they can better determine the profitability of a stock after the IPO. If an established VC 
can limit the underpricing problem and enhance the profitability of the firm, then investors will benefit 
from a lower volatility in the price of the stock after the IPO. The new company will have a lower litigation 
risk if the investor does not experience a sharp wealth decline. The litigation procedures after Facebook’s 
IPO are a good example of the information asymmetry between the firm and investors. Shareholders 
argue that Facebook and Morgan Stanley hid information about future growth prospects.  If investors 
have better indicators of a firm’s future profitability, then there will be less information asymmetries and 
lower litigation risk not only for the company but also for the underwriter. Additional cases where 
shareholders believe that the company tried to influence investors are Google and Salesforce.com in 2004. 
In both IPOs managers violated the going public process and provided information that was not included 
in the S-1. Because our methodology identifies the factors that enhance the performance of the IPO, the 
firm will be less susceptible to frivolous lawsuits if shareholders identify these factors and invest 
accordingly. If the SEC wants to avoid litigation after the IPO, it can include more information in the S-1 
that can help investors determine what factors will have a greater effect on a VC backed firm.  
If a reputable VC continues to monitor the performance of the firm after the IPO, then there will be 
lower probability of a decline in shareholders wealth due to mismanagement. To decrease litigation risk, 
the SEC can encourage investing in firms backed by reputable VCs or encourage new VCs to continue 
monitoring the firm even after the IPO.  If investors identify the firms that increase their profitability due 
to having the financial support of a reputable VC, then the demand for reputable VC backed IPOs should 
increase. Less reputable VCs will then have more pressure to do IPOs with mature firms and to continue 
monitoring them after the IPO. 
In addition to the typical prediction of profitability, the benefit in the estimation of the system of 
equations (1) and (3) is that profitability determinants change by the type of firm and that firm type can 
also be predicted. The implications regarding reducing asymmetric information can be generalized to 
other markets as the use of mixture methods can serve to help identify different market equilibria that 
correspond to differentiated types of market participants.3 Reducing asymmetric information in markets 
can also help mitigate problems associated with asymmetric information (i.e., adverse selection and moral 
hazard). 
 
 
                                                          
3 The mixture methods employed are very flexible and contingent on obtaining appropriate data they can also be 
applied to other markets where asymmetric information exists. 
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6. Conclusions 
This paper proposes new methods to model multiple equilibria and heterogeneous VC backed companies 
to assess the determinants of profitability (i.e., ROA and ROE) and reduce asymmetric information. In 
addition, our methods account for potential unobservable factors that separate IPOs into differentiated 
groups. Differentiation of firms is determined endogenously by the data with different groups having 
differentiated effects of the factors that affect first year profitability. After separating the VC backed IPOs 
into groups, we observe that the reputation of the seed venture capitalist is an important factor affecting 
the profitability of a small group of firms (group 𝐵 ). For this same group, an increase in capital 
expenditures decreases the return on assets. On the other hand for a larger group of firms (group 𝐴), 
profitability is also influenced by the reputation of the seed venture capitalist but its effect is much 
smaller. Interestingly, for group 𝐵 companies capital expenditures operate in the opposite direction. For 
both groups of companies a longer period between the first round of VC capital and the IPO has a positive 
impact on profitability (as captured by ROA).  
Our approach also models the probability of a firm belonging to a particular group. Our maximum 
likelihood estimates show that the average tangibility of assets in the industry where the company 
operates is one key separating factor explaining the differentiated effects on profitability. We also extend 
the interpretation to a continuum of types that allows us to more accurately capture the heterogeneity 
across VC backed companies. 
The benefit of our proposed methods is that investors have more information to assess the 
profitability of a company in its IPO year. Tian (2011) is mostly concerned with the effects of the 
interaction between capital rounds and distance on a firm’s profitability. However, because his approach 
involves a pooled regression model, the particular source of unobserved heterogeneity and asymmetric 
information that we modeled in the IPOs is not taken into account. By incorporating factors that are 
observable prior to the IPO, the investor can differentiate across otherwise unobserved heterogeneous 
companies. This should increase the investor's information set and help him evaluate more accurately 
what variables are key determinants of the profitability of an IPO.  
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Table 1. Summary Statistics 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Variables obs mean sd min max 
      
𝑅𝑂𝐴 2,404 -0.122 0.361 -7.658 0.584 
𝑅𝑂𝐸 2,397 -0.171 0.459 -1.552 0.359 
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 2,404 4.879 3.132 1 24 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 2,404 6.340 5.008 1 37 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 2,404 4.467 3.536 0 37 
𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 2,404 0.0582 0.100 3.25e-05 0.814 
𝑀𝑉 2,404 4.168e+08 1.102e+09 2.058e+06 2.422e+10 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 2,387 0.0740 0.0901 -0.00280 0.945 
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 2,396 4.862 10.97 0 113 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 2,338 7.949e+09 8.050e+10 1,000,000 3.760e+12 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵 2,402 2,868 57,803 0.713 2.161e+06 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷 2,378 24.15 341.6 5.05e-10 14,401 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸 2,403 0.295 0.115 0.0433 0.750 
Notes: This table provides descriptive statistics of venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 
and 2012. 𝑅𝑂𝐴 is measured as net income including extraordinary items divided by total assets 
on the year of the IPO, 𝑅𝑂𝐸 is net income including extraordinary items divided by total book 
value of equity on the year of the IPO, 𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 is the number of venture capital rounds that the 
company receives, 𝑉𝐶𝑠  are the number of venture capitalists that finance a company, 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 is the number of years between the first capital round and the IPO date, 𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 is 
the aggregate market value of all firms taken public by the seed VC from 1980 to the year of the 
first round divided by the aggregate market value of all VC backed IPOs during the same period, 
𝑀𝑉  is the market value at the IPO date, 𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠  equals the company’s capital 
expenditures divided by its total assets on the year of the IPO, 𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 is the number of 
years between the funding and the year when the first round of VC money was received, 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 is the dollar amount received during the first capital round, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵 is the 
average industry market-to-book ratio measured as the market value of equity divided by book 
value of equity, 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷 is the average industry research and development to total assets, 
and 𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸 is the average ratio of property, plant, and equipment to total assets. 
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Table 2. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Pooled Model 
Dependent variable: 𝑅𝑂𝐴 𝑅𝑂𝐸 
   
Variables in 𝑋: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
       
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.0119*** -0.00841*** -0.0125*** -0.0179*** -0.0126*** -0.0183*** 
 (0.00234) (0.00301) (0.00314) (0.00297) (0.00383) (0.00396) 
𝑉𝐶𝑠  -0.00343* -0.00653***  -0.00518** -0.00967*** 
  (0.00188) (0.00194)  (0.00240) (0.00244) 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛   0.0129***   0.0175*** 
   (0.00224)   (0.00282) 
𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝   0.472***   0.702*** 
   (0.0753)   (0.0948) 
𝑀𝑉   -2.00e-11***   -2.72e-11*** 
   (6.68e-12)   (8.42e-12) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠   -0.156*   -0.341*** 
   (0.0811)   (0.102) 
Constant -0.0642*** -0.0594*** -0.0855*** -0.0842*** -0.0769*** -0.103*** 
 (0.0135) (0.0138) (0.0167) (0.0172) (0.0175) (0.0210) 
       
𝜎 -1.025*** -1.026*** -1.043*** -0.787*** -0.788*** -0.813*** 
 (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) (0.0144) (0.0144) (0.0145) 
       
Observations 2,404 2,404 2,387 2,397 2,397 2,380 
Log Likelihood -946.1 -944.4 -897.3 -1515 -1512 -1443 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the pooled model. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑂𝐴 in columns 1 through 3 
and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 in columns 4 through 6. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all variables are 
explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 3. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
   
Variables in 𝑋: Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.00968*** -0.00409 -0.0126*** 0.00358 
 (0.00174) (0.0163) (0.00222) (0.0133) 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 -0.00662*** 0.00380 -0.00811*** 0.00623 
 (0.00103) (0.00961) (0.00135) (0.00746) 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.0108*** -0.00111 0.0136*** 0.00167 
 (0.00119) (0.0111) (0.00157) (0.0100) 
𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.306*** 0.926** 0.386*** 1.165*** 
 (0.0379) (0.416) (0.0516) (0.299) 
𝑀𝑉 -1.50e-11*** -8.06e-11 -3.59e-11*** 1.33e-11 
 (3.25e-12) (5.44e-11) (6.45e-12) (1.69e-11) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.140*** -0.881** 0.247*** -1.206*** 
 (0.0423) (0.378) (0.0551) (0.286) 
Constant -0.0153* -0.530*** 0.0264** -0.866*** 
 (0.00879) (0.104) (0.0117) (0.101) 
     
𝜎 -1.877*** -0.478*** -1.652*** -0.693*** 
 (0.0277) (0.0419) (0.0265) (0.0436) 
     
Observations 2,387 2,380 
   
Log Likelihood -1.288 -708.2 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑂𝐴 (model 1) and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 
(model 2). Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Our 
sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all variables are explained 
in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 4. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
   
Variables in 𝑋: Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.00944*** -0.00146 -0.0123*** -0.00628 
 (0.00180) (0.0132) (0.00222) (0.0122) 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 -0.00579*** 0.00359 -0.00689*** 0.00439 
 (0.00104) (0.00782) (0.00137) (0.00673) 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.00981*** 0.0132 0.0127*** 0.0167* 
 (0.00122) (0.0110) (0.00157) (0.00957) 
𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.273*** 0.912*** 0.335*** 1.186*** 
 (0.0380) (0.345) (0.0513) (0.268) 
𝑀𝑉 -3.32e-11*** 5.65e-12 -7.39e-11*** 2.67e-11** 
 (6.93e-12) (1.65e-11) (1.37e-11) (1.21e-11) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.150*** -0.817** 0.258*** -1.371*** 
 (0.0423) (0.330) (0.0552) (0.272) 
Constant 0.00173 -0.576*** 0.0490*** -0.757*** 
 (0.00941) (0.0849) (0.0123) (0.0842) 
     
𝜎 -1.964*** -0.546*** -1.723*** -0.678*** 
 (0.0380) (0.0421) (0.0286) (0.0338) 
     
Variables in 𝑍: 
   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 0.105*** 0.0887*** 
 (0.0205) (0.0154) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 -5.97e-13 -1.66e-12 
 (3.50e-12) (1.51e-12) 
Constant 1.060*** 0.792*** 
 (0.134) (0.107) 
     
Observations 2,315 2,308 
   
Log Likelihood 31.01 -640.3 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The indicator factors are Year 1 Round and First 
Money. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑂𝐴 in model 1 and 𝑅𝑂𝐸 in model 2. Figures in parentheses are standard 
errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs 
between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Table 5. Maximum Likelihood Estimates of the Mixture Model 
Dependent variable: ROA ROE 
Model: (1) (2) 
   
Variables in 𝑋: Group A Group B Group A Group B 
     
𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑𝑠 -0.00705*** -0.00754 -0.0118*** -0.0105 
 (0.00166) (0.00956) (0.00219) (0.0111) 
𝑉𝐶𝑠 -0.00380*** 0.000372 -0.00600*** 0.00266 
 (0.00102) (0.00564) (0.00134) (0.00616) 
𝐼𝑛𝑐𝑢𝑏𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 0.00749*** 0.0148* 0.0120*** 0.0152* 
 (0.00117) (0.00810) (0.00155) (0.00881) 
𝑉𝐶 𝐶𝑎𝑝 0.193*** 0.758*** 0.301*** 1.123*** 
 (0.0356) (0.274) (0.0494) (0.265) 
𝑀𝑉 -6.32e-11*** 1.35e-11 -8.99e-11*** 2.84e-11** 
 (7.41e-12) (1.13e-11) (1.25e-11) (1.15e-11) 
𝐶𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑥/𝐴𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑠 0.118*** -1.104*** 0.227*** -1.693*** 
 (0.0377) (0.266) (0.0546) (0.263) 
Constant 0.0273*** -0.414*** 0.0626*** -0.637*** 
 (0.00887) (0.0629) (0.0116) (0.0738) 
     
𝜎 -2.152*** -0.674*** -1.769*** -0.689*** 
 (0.0546) (0.0377) (0.0281) (0.0307) 
     
Variables in 𝑍: 
   
𝑌𝑒𝑎𝑟1𝑅𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑑 0.118*** 0.0942*** 
 (0.0185) (0.0157) 
𝐹𝑖𝑟𝑠𝑡 𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑒𝑦 -1.19e-12 -2.04e-12 
 (4.23e-12) (1.30e-12) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑀𝑇𝐵 3.24e-06 3.23e-06 
 (3.02e-06) (3.12e-06) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑅&𝐷 -0.000367 -0.000601 
 (0.000472) (0.000452) 
𝐼𝑛𝑑𝑢𝑠𝑡𝑟𝑦 𝑃𝑃𝐸 6.978*** 5.226*** 
 (0.823) (0.707) 
Constant -1.391*** -0.829*** 
 (0.273) (0.230) 
     
Observations 2,315 2,308 
   
Log Likelihood 31.01 -640.3 
Notes: This table shows MLE estimates of the mixture model. The dependent variable is 𝑅𝑂𝐴 in model 1 and 
𝑅𝑂𝐸  in model 2. Figures in parentheses are standard errors. ***, **, * significant at 1%, 5%, and 10% 
respectively. Our sample includes venture capital backed IPOs between 1980 and 2012. Definitions of all 
variables are explained in the notes of Table 1. 
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Figure 1. Probability of being in Group A 
 
  Notes: Estimated based on Model 1, Table 5. 
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